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2 The status and prospects of energy
market integration in East Asia
Xunpeng Shi and Fukunari Kimura
Introduction
Energy market integration (EMI) has been pursued in East Asia for decades. How-
ever, no explicit definition of EMI has been established yet. There is a vague
consensus in East Asia that main benefits and incentives to promote EMI should
be found in improving energy security, energy efficiency, the establishment of
emergency response systems and so on; reducing carbon dioxide emissions; and
facilitating regional integration (Shi and Kimura, 2010; Kimura and Shi, 2011).
However, what would be the final goal of EMI and how it should proceed in
East Asia has not been clear at all.
One key reason is that the architecture of East Asian economic integration itself
is still under development. Although European Union style integration is not obvi-
ously appropriate in East Asia, an alternative for EAS has not been well defined
yet. Without a clear definition of the EMI goals and boundaries, it is difficult
to formulate concrete strategies and actions to promote EMI by using a top-
down approach, i.e., setting the ultimate goals and following well-defined steps
to achieve them with consistent strategies and actions.
Given the lack of a clear vision for EMI in East Asia, the first ERIA EMI report
(Shi and Kimura, 2010) proposed a conceptual framework based on an incremen-
tal, bottom-up approach to review the process and impacts of EMI. This approach
identifies areas where closer integration can be achieved even without defining the
ultimate goals of EMI. The five issues that were initially identified in the concep-
tual framework are: trade liberalization; investment liberalization; the linkage of
regional energy infrastructure; the liberalization of domestic energy markets; and
energy pricing reform, in particular, removal of fossil fuel subsidies. Such a frame-
work has been implemented in later studies including Kimura and Shi (2011) and
Wu et al. (2012).
This chapter further improves and elaborates the conceptual framework. We
also aim to improve the understanding of the development, impact and prospect
of EMI through updating the status in East Asia. The next section presents the
rationale for promoting EMI in the EAS region. We then discuss the concep-
tual framework before going on to review the status of the EMI based on the
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proposed conceptual framework. The chapter concludes with remarks on policy
implications.
Rationale for pursuing energy market integration
EMI intends to promote the development of national economies, narrow devel-
opment gaps among EMI participating countries, improve energy security, and
reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Some quantitative studies on EMI in
East Asia demonstrate that EMI can boost economic development and reduce CO2
emissions in the region as a whole (Bhattacharya and Kojima, 2008; Bhattacharya
and Kojima, 2010; Kimura and Shi, 2011). EMI can also narrow development
gaps and facilitate regional growth convergence because less developed coun-
tries will benefit more than their richer counterparts, as discussed in Chapter 4,
while reducing energy market volatility (Sheng and Shi, 2012). Estimations of
the impact of free trade agreements (FTAs) involving ASEAN also imply in gen-
eral that integration is beneficial (Park, 2000; Lee et al., 2009; Lee and Plummer,
2010).
The integration of energy markets within the ASEAN region and with other
EAS members may optimize the utilization of energy resources and improve
energy security for the EAS region. The ASEAN energy sector can both supply
energy and provide investment opportunities for ASEAN dialogue countries such
as China, Japan and South Korea. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam all
have large potential to produce oil and gas. Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar have
significant undeveloped hydropower potential and therefore provide opportunities
for technology transfer and investment by the ‘Plus Six’ countries of ASEAN,
namely, Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand. Southeast
Asia is expected to become ‘the Persian Gulf of Gas’ and be responsible for one-
quarter of the world’s gas production and usage by 2030 (Sovacool, 2009). Eight
ASEAN countries (i.e., the ten ASEAN nations minus Singapore and Brunei)
have considerable potential to produce biofuels due to their favourable climate
and abundant land. ASEAN countries also play an important role in the security
of energy transportation for major oil importers, namely, China, South Korea and
Japan since the Strait of Malacca is under the governance of Malaysia, Indonesia
and Singapore.
There is significant potential for the EAS region to strengthen mutual economic
interdependence and boost the regional EMI. Australia, New Zealand, Japan and
South Korea are leading countries in energy-related technologies, management
and regulatory framework and thus can provide lessons for the rest of the region.
Australia is particularly important for the EAS region in its endowment of energy
resources including coal, natural gas and uranium, which can improve the security
of energy supply for other EAS countries. Japan, being one of the world’s most
advanced countries in energy efficient technologies and their practice, can share
with the region its technologies and practices in improving energy efficiency. East
Asia is emerging as the world’s leading producer of renewable energy such as wind
energy. It is projected that East Asia will account for around a third of total global
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wind power capacity by 2020, just behind Europe’s 35 per cent share but ahead
of North America’s 29 per cent (Dent, 2011). Investment by ASEAN’s dialogue
partners, such as China, Japan and Korea, can facilitate the development of energy
production and infrastructure in less developed countries such as Cambodia, Laos
and Myanmar which still have low electrification rates.
Although East Asia possesses technological, financial and energy resources to
boost EMI, it is challenged by financial constraints as well as technical and reg-
ulatory differences among countries. ASEAN is a good example of this. Since
ASEAN has worked towards the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) for a long
time, its integration should be the most advanced in East Asia. However, even
within ASEAN, EMI is moving slowly due to many factors: energy and the envi-
ronmental regulations differ greatly between the ASEAN Member States (AMSs);
legal protection of investment is not solid in some AMSs, and thus there is a reluc-
tance to invest by the private sector; a deregulated market has not yet been created
in most AMSs, and thus third party access1 is not secure; anti-competitive prac-
tices prevail; and no dispute settlement mechanism has been established in most
AMSs (Shi and Malik, 2012). Diversification in standards for electrical appliances
is another major barrier for the development of energy infrastructure and trade in
electricity (Shi and Kimura, 2010). A more challenging task is to construct open
and competitive energy markets and remove inefficient fossil fuel subsidies at the
national level.
Lack of political trust is an additional factor that will prevent further integration
of energy markets in the EAS region. Within ASEAN, there is still mutual distrust
among potential trading partners (ACE, 2006). This lack of political trust has a
significant impact on trade in pipeline gas and electricity. Once a physical network
is established and supply is reliant on the cross-border trade, the importer could
be hurt at any time by a supply interruption. Such interruptions could be caused
by political disputes as well as economic and technical reasons. One example of
disruption due to political reasons is Russia’s suspension of gas supply to the
European Union in 2009 (Fox News, 2009).
Individual countries currently pursue their own national energy security rather
than depending on regional energy security strategies. National energy security
requires that nations reduce their energy supply dependence on other nations and
therefore limit opportunities for trade and cooperation. At a regional level, such a
limitation to trade in energy, such as electricity, is not optimal in economic terms,
and the region can gain from a more open market (Chang and Li, 2012). In order
to pursue an integrated energy market, the paradigm of energy security has to
shift from national isolation to regional cooperation. If a regional energy security
strategy is pursued instead, many countries should become more open to foreign
investment and energy supply, which provides a chance for optimizing the use of
energy resources in the region.
Considering these huge opportunities and challenges, policy-makers have long
been pursuing integrated energy markets in ASEAN and the EAS. ASEAN has
tried to integrate its gas pipeline and electricity grids since the 1990s (APAEC,
1999). The ASEAN power grid (APG) and Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline (TAGP)
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are two flagship projects for the ASEAN EMI. Greater cooperation in energy trade
has been achieved through the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) process and, from 2005,
the EAS process. The EAS leaders have affirmed their strong interest in promot-
ing economic integration, as well as EMI, as evidenced by the Cebu Declaration2
(Cebu Declaration, 2007).
The conceptual framework
We propose a conceptual framework for EMI in the EAS region in the incremen-
tal, bottom-up approach, rather than having a lucid theoretical breakdown when
a top-down approach would work. The lack of clear vision is due to the fact that
EMI is only a part of broad regional integration architecture, the vision of which
has not been explicitly set yet. EMI is also subject to other serious economic and
political issues such as national sovereignty, energy security, and other sensitive
issues such as subsidy removal, which may not be agreed upon in the near future.
Shi and Kimura (2010) proposed to review the status of EMI from the following
perspectives: trade liberalization, investment liberalization, cross-border linkage
of energy infrastructure; energy pricing reform; and liberalization of domestic
energy markets. This framework was followed up by the later studies on EMI
including Shi and Kimura (2011) and Wu et al. (2012).
We further developed the framework for the study on EMI from multiple angles.
One major improvement is that we incorporate institutions into the infrastruc-
ture discussion. The refined conceptual framework for studying EMI includes an
analysis of: (a) trade liberalization, (b) investment liberalization, (c) development
of regional energy infrastructure and institutions, (d) liberalization of domestic
energy markets, and (e) energy pricing reform, in particular, removal of fossil fuel
subsidies.
These five issues are important elements of EMI and are interrelated. Well-
functioning and transparent national energy markets are essential to developing
an open, competitive and more integrated EAS regional energy market. In order to
increase the efficiency of the energy market, it is necessary to remove impediments
and distortions that prevent the efficient functioning of the market. This should
include, but not be limited to, trade and investment liberalization and the reduc-
tion or removal of barriers, such as price restrictions, subsidies and monopolies.
A region-wide movement of energy products requires both physical infrastructure
and institutions to be in place. The following paragraphs provide more detailed
explanation.
Full EMI needs a regional trade regime that does not have trade restrictions or
non-trade barriers. In an integrated energy market, energy as a commodity should
be able to move freely, which then enables us to optimize the development and
utilization of energy resources in the region. Trade barriers such as tariffs and
other taxes make it difficult to move energy goods across borders. Non-trade bar-
riers such as technical standards and environmental regulations also limit trade
opportunities in a less visible way.
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Investment liberalization is another basic requirement of EMI. The energy
industry is capital intensive, and the paying back time – i.e., the time period over
which the investment costs in capital infrastructure are recovered – is often quite
long (a period of several years). The investor’s liquidity is also relatively lower
in the energy sector than other sectors such as manufacturing. If investment is
restricted at national borders, the movement of capital, technology and manage-
rial knowhow will not be free, which will adversely affect efficiency in allocating
energy investment across the region. Since energy investment often needs a rel-
atively long payback time and liquidity is low, a stable investment regime is
important for investors; otherwise, they would be discouraged by the risks.
Physical linkage of energy infrastructure is essential to facilitate trade, attract
investment and reduce frictional costs among markets, and thus is necessary for
the integration of energy markets. This is especially true in the case of electric-
ity trade, which requires power grids to be in place. Trade in coal, oil and gas
also needs roads, ports or ships. Innovative infrastructure methods such as marine
transportation and liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals can allow more countries
to be involved in regional energy networks and thus expand the opportunities of
energy trade.
Physical infrastructure must be accompanied by appropriate institutional
arrangements. Without it, energy trade will not occur, and the optional allocation
of resources will not be realized. An integrated regional electricity market needs
harmonized regulations and standards associated with consumer protection and
safety standards; legal and tax issues; contract forms; tariff-setting mechanisms;
and trading systems (Wu, 2012).
National market liberalization is important both for the operation of infras-
tructure and the facilitation of trade and investment. Conceptually, an integrated
energy market requires each of its components to be open and harmonized so
that they can be connected to form a united market. In practice, in order to facil-
itate energy trade and make it possible for new investors to enter energy markets,
it is important to liberalize and establish competitive national energy markets. For
example, open access to energy infrastructure, such as pipelines and power grids,
is a prerequisite for foreign investors to enter the national energy sector. If the
national market is not liberalized, the incumbent players, usually state-owned, will
gain preferential treatment, easily keep out newcomers, and thus leave the regional
energy market to be fragmented.
The adoption of a market-oriented pricing mechanism in member countries is
also a precondition for regional EMI. Energy subsidies not only distort national
markets but also result in unsustainable energy-use patterns and inefficient invest-
ment. They may delay the development of energy projects and reduce oppor-
tunities for mutually beneficial trade (Bannister et al., 2008). For example, the
weighted average retail electricity tariff in Vietnam is lower than the long-run
marginal cost of supplying that electricity, and thus Vietnam fails to attract com-
mercial investment in the electricity sector (Kimura, 2010). Energy subsidies also
threaten national economies. If the world energy prices increase, subsidies for
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energy imported at world prices can become too costly and unaffordable for pub-
lic finance, as happened in Indonesia and Malaysia in 2009 (The Straits Times,
2010).
In order not to leak the benefits of national subsidies out to other nations, a
country with subsidized energy often has to close its borders, which goes against
the principles of EMI. For example, in order to prevent cars from Singapore ben-
efitting from subsidized fuels in Malaysia, the Malaysian government has banned
the sale of fuel to foreign cars in the border area (Sim and Vijayan, 2008). Proba-
bly as a response, the Singaporean government has set the requirement that anyone
leaving Singapore in a Singapore-registered motor vehicle must have more than
three-quarters of a tank full of motor fuel (Singapore Customs, 2011). Such a
‘border closure’ policy works against the integration of energy markets, and its
implementation is costly.
Our conceptual framework based on a bottom-up approach can assist policy-
makers and researchers in analysing the complicated issues involved in promot-
ing closer integration. In the next section, we review the status of EMI based
on it.
Overview of EAS energy market integration
Trade liberalization
Trade liberalization has been strongly promoted in East Asia with ASEAN play-
ing a leading role. ASEAN aims to establish AEC by 2015 (ASEAN, 2009). The
aim for the AEC is to have a single market and production base, which certainly
requires the free flow of goods, and this is being pursued through the ASEAN
Free Trade Area (AFTA). By 2010, tariffs within ASEAN for more than 99 per
cent of the tariff lines had been eliminated in the ASEAN-6 members, namely,
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, and has
been brought down steadily in the newer members, namely, Cambodia, Laos,
Myanmar and Vietnam. As for energy trade, tariffs in mineral fuels were reduced
dramatically between 1993 and 2010 (Okabe and Urata, 2012). ASEAN has also
conducted negotiations on FTAs or economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with
countries outside ASEAN and has established FTAs with the Plus Six countries
(ASEAN, 2012). ASEAN is also working towards the ‘Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership’ (RCEP) (also known as ‘ASEAN++FTA’).
In East Asia as a whole, while trade in energy remains restricted by tariffs,
the levels of tariffs substantially declined in the period from 1995 to 2010, as evi-
denced by the import tariffs reported in Table 2.1. Weighted import tariffs for coal,
oil and electricity among the 16 EAS countries were 0.72 per cent, 0.09 per cent
and 1.22 per cent respectively in 2010.
India’s import tariff on coal is notably high compared with other countries. Oil
imports are only taxed in five countries, three of which – Indonesia, Myanmar and
Vietnam – are also major oil producers. Two major global oil importers – China
and Japan – do not apply tariffs to oil imports. Electricity also seems to be subject
to high weighted import tariffs when compared with coal, oil and natural gas.
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Table 2.1 Effectively applied import tariffs for energy products among EAS members,
1995–2010
Product Tariff Simple Weighted Minimum Maximum Import value,
name year average average rate rate 1,000 USD
Coal 1995 3.32 0.49 0 20 5,062,009
2000 2.97 2.06 0 15 5,447,148
2005 2.19 2.97 0 15 16,881,283
2008 1.04 1.14 0 10 22,052,490
2009 0.92 0.61 0 7 40,966,455
2010 0.93 0.72 0 7 34,762,717
Oil 1995 1.93 1.01 0 10 10,082,124
2000 2.58 1.92 0 20 13,855,149
2005 1.02 0.19 0 15 25,568,192
2008 0.89 0.16 0 10 28,084,822
2009 0.65 0.13 0 6 35,882,340
2010 0.66 0.19 0 6 23,998,798
Gas 1995 5.51 0.01 0 12 6,837,751
2000 4.64 0 0 30 10,394,455
2005 1.16 0.02 0 10 15,507,887
2008 0.59 0 0 5 21,458,583
2009 0.58 0 0 5 32,075,595
2010 0.59 0 0 5 23,766,260
Electricity 1995 0 0 0 0 197
2000 3 3 3 3 548
2005 0.86 0.48 0 5 123,933
2008 1.38 1.14 0 5 377,821
2009 1.22 1.22 0 5 351,784
2010 1.22 1.22 0 5 351,784
Source: The data in the table were extracted from WITS database.
Note: For some years, data are missing and we replaced them with the closest earlier years’ data.
However, the value of electricity trade in the period 1995–2010 was trivial when
compared with the other three kinds of fuel.
Trade in energy is also prone to discretionary policies on both export-
ing and importing countries such as export taxes and quantitative restrictions.
A fresh example is Indonesia’s proposal on restricting exports of low rank coal
(Bloomberg, 2013). In fact, Indonesia and China have maintained a quota system
for coal export for many years. However, exporters can apply for an increased
quota if required.
Investment liberalization
In the current East Asian development model, foreign direct investment (FDI) is
regarded as an important component of economic growth for both developed and
developing countries, and most East Asian economies have an interest in liberaliz-
ing investment and welcoming FDI. Bilateral FTAs as well as AEC initiative and















































Figure 2.1 Overall foreign investment liberalization rate in ASEAN (percentage).
Source: Intal et al. (2011), as revised by Intal and Panggabean in 2012.
ASEAN + 1 FTAs are intended to promote investment, and most of these FTAs
include investment chapters.
Investment liberalization is at the heart of ASEAN economic integration.
Redirection of new foreign investment away from ASEAN and mainly into China
in the late 1990s and early 2000s was one of the reasons for ASEAN’s decision to
accelerate its economic integration process. ASEAN believes that a free and open
investment regime is key to enhancing ASEAN’s competitiveness and attracting
FDI as well as activating intra-ASEAN investment (ASEAN, 2009).
A recent study on investment liberalization in ASEAN countries (Intal et al.,
2011) shows that overall the foreign investment regime is relatively open in
ASEAN, with five AMSs having overall liberalization rates between 88 per
cent and 92 per cent; three AMSs with liberalization around 85 per cent;
and the other two hovered around the 80 per cent rate. Among the individual
countries, Malaysia, Cambodia and the Philippines had the most open foreign
investment regime, followed closely by Thailand and Brunei, while Vietnam
and Indonesia had the most restrictive investment regimes among the ASEAN
members (Figure 2.1).
As for the mining sector, foreign equity investment is relatively restricted in
Singapore (especially), the Philippines, Brunei and Thailand, compared to the rest
of East Asia. Malaysia stands out as the most open ASEAN country. The other
countries were at the same level in terms of foreign equity liberalization rates
in 2011. When evaluating countries in terms of their progress in liberalizing for-
eign investment, which takes into consideration the restrictions on foreign equity
investment, national treatment and other domestic regulatory barriers, the results















































Foreign equity liberalization in mining
Foreign investment liberalization in mining
Figure 2.2 Overall liberalization rates in ASEAN mining sector (percentage).
Source: Intal et al. (2011), as revised by Intal and Panggabean in 2012.
Note: The score does not apply to Singapore which has almost no mining activities.
are more or less the same across countries. However, the Philippines became more
liberalized due to the betterment of national treatment (Figure 2.2). Note that the
estimates of the liberalization rates in the study are based on commitments in the
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA). The actual liberalization
rate may be different depending on whether the actual regulations are consistent
with the commitments.
An earlier study shows that investment in the energy sector remains restricted
in the ASEAN dialogue partners (Bannister et al., 2008). Some countries such
as Australia tend to welcome foreign investment in the resource sector and do
not have rules to ban majority foreign ownership. Others such as China require
majority ownership of local counterparts or apply other restrictions to foreign
investment, which may limit or even inhibit foreign investment. The restrictions
on investment are often embedded in domestic regulations and thus cannot be
resolved by international agreements alone.
Development of regional energy infrastructure and institutions
Linkage of energy infrastructure across countries has long been pursued in
ASEAN. The AEC blueprint toward 2015 set up two flagship projects on ASEAN
energy cooperation: APG and TAGP (APAEC, 1999). The APG was proposed to
ensure regional energy security while promoting the efficient utilization and shar-
ing of resources (APAEC, 2009). The ASEAN Interconnection Master Plan Study
(AIMS) II finalized in 2010 identified 16 interconnection systems to be developed
under the APG programme. At the time of writing, only five out of the 16 systems
are in operation. It is likely that three or four additional interconnection systems
will be in operation by 2015. The remaining systems have been scheduled to com-
plete after 2015. The main constraint in the development of the APG is that many
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projects are not yet commercialized. Lack of economic viability is the main reason
why APG has lagged behind the AEC targets (Shi and Malik, 2012).
The TAGP will interconnect the gas pipeline infrastructure of AMSs to ensure
the reliability of gas supply for AMSs and encourage the use of environment-
friendly fuel. At the end of 2011, there were 11 bilateral gas pipeline intercon-
nection projects in operation. Between 2001 and 2011, the distance covered by
the TAGP infrastructure almost doubled to 3,020 km as a result of the develop-
ment of six new cross-border gas pipeline interconnections. The twelfth pipeline
connection, a new 150 km pipeline connection from Myanmar to Thailand, will
be in operation in 2013 (ASCOPE, 2012). At the time of writing, although more
than half of the pipelines have been constructed, the remaining planned pipelines
depend on the development of the East Natuna gas field in Indonesia, which has
not yet been developed due to some technical and financial considerations. The
commencement date of the four pipelines is expected to be approximately seven
years from the conclusion of East Natuna gas supply agreements.
However, even if the East Natuna field can be put into operation, the gaps
between demand and indigenous supply in ASEAN remain large and are becom-
ing larger due to the depletion of indigenous reserves. Consequently, the focus of
TAGP now includes LNG as an option to secure gas supply in the region. Many
countries have also initiated the construction of LNG re-gasification terminals to
bring gas from outside the ASEAN region. LNG terminals are in operation in
Indonesia and Thailand. Construction of the LNG-receiving terminals has been
progressing well in Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam. The Singapore LNG ter-
minal became operational in 2012 at a capacity of 6 million tonnes per annum.
Thailand is increasing its capacity of LNG terminals, and Vietnam will also build
a LNG terminal to diversify the gas supply sources (Shi and Malik, 2012).
Another regional block to promoting interconnection, other than the issues
within ASEAN, is the greater Mekong sub-region (GMS) that includes Cambodia,
China’s Yunnan and Guangxi provinces, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam.
The GMS countries signed an inter-governmental agreement (IGA) on regional
power trade in 2003 and formed a regional power trade coordination commit-
tee (RPTCC) in 2003. Although the process is slow, some connectivity has
been achieved among the GMS economies. China started exporting electricity to
Vietnam in 2004, importing electricity from Myanmar in 2008 and exporting elec-
tricity to Laos in 2009 (Wu, 2012). Construction of the Myanmar–China oil and
gas pipelines began in June 2010 and will be completed in 2013 (Xinhua, 2010).
At the time of writing, proposed energy infrastructure projects are concentrated
within the ASEAN region plus China, partly because the other Plus Six coun-
tries of ASEAN, excluding India, are somewhat physically disconnected. India
has a potential to link with other EAS countries because of its convenient location
between gas supply centres and East Asian demand regions, but no plan has been
set yet. In the EAS area, other regional interconnections have also been proposed,
such as potential interconnection between Japan and South Korea for emergency
backup and trade with Russia, and potential interconnection between India and
Myanmar (Wu, 2012). With the development of more infrastructure, such as
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marine transportation and LNG terminals, networks of energy infrastructure may
be expanded to other countries, such as the Philippines and Australia in the case
of LNG. In general there is still a long way to go in terms of interconnectivity and
trade in the EAS electricity sector. EAS is also lagging behind Europe where phys-
ical cross-border exchanges of electricity reached 10.3 per cent of consumption in
2005 (Wu, 2012).
Institutional arrangements and organizations are necessary in order to promote
regional energy security and development including regional power interconnec-
tion. Harmonization of technical specifications for the electricity trade, including
design and construction standards, system operation and maintenance codes and
guidelines, safety, environment and measurement standards, are internationally
recognized needs (Shi and Kimura, 2010). However, very little progress has been
made. In ASEAN, discussion on the institutional infrastructure has started but is
only in the phase of preparation for study (preparation of Terms of Reference),
and progress has been slow due to lack of financial resources (Shi and Malik,
2012).
National energy market liberalization
Behind national borders within ASEAN, barriers are deterring regional integra-
tion, and such domestic barriers are often difficult to remove (ADB, 2010). To
promote EMI, national energy markets must be competitive, which often requires
the break-up of vertically integrated energy enterprises. EMI is heavily affected by
national energy market regulations. Electricity is often the most restricted energy
product, and the electricity market is segmented by national boundaries. In many
EAS countries there is only one vertically integrated state-owned electricity com-
pany, and thus there is little chance for new investors, private or foreign, to enter
the market.
The effort of liberalizing and deregulating the electricity sector has been ini-
tiated in many countries around the word. The most common reforms include
the break-up of monopolies; privatizing the state-owned utilities; introducing a
wholesale market; increasing transparency in industrial information; encouraging
consumer switching; and regulatory incentives for transmission and distribution
investment (Shen and Yang, 2012). Electricity sector reform has been imple-
mented across the ASEAN region since the 1980s, aiming to break up monopolies
and attract investment. Many targets, however, have not been achieved (Sharma,
2005).
In the EAS region, energy market liberalization has been conducted in
Australia, Japan, India, New Zealand, the Philippines and Singapore, while
in other countries, energy markets are more or less restricted. India and the
Philippines are pioneers in liberalizing their domestic energy markets (Shi and
Kimura, 2010). India has opened up its energy sectors with the exception of coal.
Overall in East Asia, energy market liberalization is at a very preliminary stage,
as demonstrated by Bannister et al. (2008). In terms of market integration, most
EAS members are yet to develop a national electricity market. In terms of the
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integration and unbundling of business activities, on one end of the spectrum
are Australia, New Zealand and Singapore, which have fully disaggregated the
generation, transmission, distribution and retailing operations, while at the other
end is Brunei, which has a fully integrated and stated-owned electricity sector.
China and India have kept the retailing and distribution operations integrated and
have separated the other two operations – generation and transmission. In the other
EAS countries only the power generation is independent (Wu, 2012).
In order to build an open and competitive domestic market, it is important
to establish clear and transparent market rules and principles. This will provide
strong legal protection, reduce transaction costs to business, enhance investor
confidence, and enable the free flow of goods, services and capital.
Energy pricing reform and fossil fuel subsidies
Energy subsidies, frequently defined as ‘any government action that lowers the
cost of energy production, raises the revenue of energy producers, or lowers the
price paid by energy consumers’, are a common feature in developing countries
Global Study Initiative (2011). In East Asia energy subsidies are deep rooted in
their social and political structures starting from the time of colonization when
Western forces used cheaper energy as an instrument to reduce the protests made
by local people over extraction of natural resources (Kojima and Bhattacharya,
2011). For example, India and Laos, which have limited domestic oil produc-
tion, have regulations on oil prices, and Indonesia and Malaysia maintain a heavy
subsidy scheme for gasoline.
Energy subsidies can cause problems in investment, consumption, national
economies and so on. They may delay the development of energy projects and
reduce opportunities for mutually beneficial trade (Bannister et al., 2008). If the
world energy prices increase, subsidies on energy imported at these prices can
become very costly, as happened in Indonesia and Malaysia (The Straits Times,
2010). Energy subsidies not only distort national markets but also cause unsustain-
able use patterns and inefficient investment. For example, the weighted average
retail electricity tariff in Vietnam is lower than the long-run marginal cost of elec-
tricity production, and thus Vietnam fails to attract commercial investment into
the electricity sector (Kimura, 2010).
These subsidies often distort the market while producing negative incentives,
namely, the misuse and overuse of cheaper energy sources. With under-priced
fuels, consumers tend to use more than they would if fuels were more expensive.
A low price due to subsidies may also allow a fuel to be used in cases where the
marginal value added from the use is lower than the market price of the fuel. Even
if the subsidies are designed with the objective of shielding poor consumers from
high oil prices, poor people are not necessarily the largest beneficiaries. A report
based on Indonesia by Ardiansyah (2012) argued that fuel subsidy policies benefit
the rich more than the poor: the 40 per cent richest households captured 70 per cent
of the fuel subsidies.
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Pricing reforms, in particular removal of energy subsidies, have been declared
by policy-makers and attempted by some countries. Energy prices have been
broadly liberalized in Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and the
Philippines. The APEC leaders have declared that they would rationalize and
phase out fossil fuel subsidies over the medium term (APEC, 2009). Plans or
actions for liberalizing energy prices and removing subsidies for fossil energy
have been implemented in many countries, such as China, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia and Vietnam. In China, energy subsidies are currently being cut, and the
government is promoting market-determined energy prices. China implemented
market-based pricing for coal in the past few years (Yu, 2008). Malaysia planned
to cut its fuel subsidies under a proposed five-year plan starting from 2010 (The
Straits Times, 2010). In Vietnam, a road map for energy price increases has been
formulated, but so far the implementation has lagged behind (Kimura, 2010). The
Indonesian government planned a gradual reduction of total subsidies by 10–15
per cent per year on average from 2011–14 (Mourougane, 2010), but the first
attempt in March 2012 failed. In general, removal of fossil fuel subsidies is polit-
ically sensitive as shown in Indonesia and Malaysia (The Straits Times, 2010).
Therefore, the pricing reform has to be carefully planned and managed.
Education of the public and compromise between political parties are impor-
tant prerequisites for a successful removal of energy subsidies. If the public is
not convinced, a subsidy removal could induce unrest and possibly even riots.
Fuel subsidy removal could also be complicated by other domestic issues. Many
demonstrations triggered by fuel subsidy removal are believed to be a result of
wider public dissatisfaction with the corruption and inefficiency that was per-
ceived to permeate political and bureaucratic life in Indonesia (Bacon and Kojima,
2006). Another observation is that fuel subsidy removal is often used as a weapon
in domestic politics. The failure of reducing gasoline subsidies in Indonesia in
March 2012 was partly because the parliament could not agree on a plan.
Concluding remarks
This chapter discusses the rationale for EMI, proposes a conceptual frame-
work, and reviews progress of the EMI in the EAS region. The review finds
that a large number of attempts at policy reform have been made to increase
bilateral/multilateral trade and investment liberalization. However, energy trade
continues to be restricted with both trade and non-trade barriers, and thus further
efforts to remove these trade barriers should be taken to achieve freer trade in the
EAS region. In particular, investment is restricted in many EAS countries; ongo-
ing and proposed energy infrastructure projects have been limited to ASEAN and
China, while institutional arrangements related to energy trade have not been well
developed; and major challenges exist at national levels, such as the liberalization
of the domestic energy market and removal of fossil fuel subsidies.
Much work needs to be done on both the physical and institutional part of
regional interconnections, particularly more on the latter because it has lagged
behind progress in the physical aspect. Development of physical infrastructure
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should continuously move forward because physical infrastructure is a neces-
sary factor in realizing regional energy trade. Meanwhile, associated institutional
arrangements, such as technical and environmental standards, fiscal policy and
regional transmission agreements, should also be established in an integrated
energy market.
Good investment policy and governance should be implemented to liberalize
national energy markets. To deepen the integration of energy markets, it is also
necessary to improve political trust among countries involved in the integration.
Each country needs to have a comprehensive road map to achieve market-
oriented energy pricing mechanisms. For sensitive and challenging issues such
as market liberalization and subsidy removal, policy discussions should be
undertaken for long-term implementation of these goals with immediate action
plans.
Notes
1 Arrangement for third party access for power interconnection and trade in accor-
dance with internationally accepted standards in the electricity supply industry and the
formulation of a transmission pricing framework within ASEAN.
2 EMI is one of the three work streams under the EAS Energy Cooperation Task Force
(ECTF), which was established based on the Cebu Declaration.
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